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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Nathan Todd appeals the judgment of conviction entered 
upon the jury verdict finding him guilty of grand theft. Banbury claims his 
conviction should be reversed due to testimony at trial to which he did not object. 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings 
Banbury went to Super Sport Motor and asked the owner, Carter Palmer, 
if he could look at a 2003 Cadillac. (Trial Tr., p.116, L.24 -p.117, L.23.) At the 
time, Mr. Palmer was inside doing paperwork and agreed to give Banbury the 
keys so he could look inside the car, but told him he could not drive it. (Trial Tr., 
p.117, Ls.17-20; p.118, Ls.11-16.) Banbury asked "more than once" if he could 
drive the car, but Mr. Palmer declined each time. (Trial Tr., p.121, Ls.11-12; 
p.121, L.24 - p.122, L.3.) Mr. Palmer continued his paperwork whiie Banbury 
was outside looking at the Cadillac. (Trial Tr., p.122, Ls.4-7.) The next time Mr. 
Palmer looked out into the lot, the Cadillac was gone. (Trial Tr., p.122, Ls.7-8.) 
Mr. Palmer went outside, looked down the street and saw the car at a nearby 
stoplight. (Trial Tr., p.122, Ls.10-17.) Mr. Palmer "immediately" went back to this 
office and reported the theft, providing a detailed description of both the Cadillac 
and Banbury. (Trial Tr., p.122, L.17 - p.123, L.8.) 
After reporting the theft to law enforcement, Mr. Palmer also told a friend 
who stopped by the dealership a "couple of hours" after the car was stolen. (Trial 
Tr., p.123, Ls.14-17.) Mr. Palmer's friend agreed to keep his "eyes open" for the 
Cadillac. (Trial Tr., p.123, Ls.18-21.) "Approximately 30 minutes later,'' Mr. 
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Palmer's friend called him and said, "I think I've spotted your car." (Trial Tr., 
p.123, Ls.23-25.) Mr. Palmer responded to his friend's location, saw his Cadillac 
parked in the carport of a nearby house, and reported it to the police. (Trial Tr., 
p.124, L.2 - p.125, L.12.) Police arrived at the residence, made contact with 
Banbury, who provided the key to the car. (See generally Trial Tr., pp.131-147.) 
Banbury also acknowledged his prints would "probably" be found in the car. 
(Trial Tr., p.147, Ls.6-7.) Law enforcement also found additional evidence 
demonstrating Banbury's efforts to eliminate identifying information from the 
Cadillac. Specifically, the car, which appeared to have been washed, no longer 
had the price written on the window, and the dealership placard was found cut up 
in Banbury's garbage can along with the "as-is warranty slip." (Trial Tr., p.119, 
L.24 - p.120, L.22 (Mr. Palmer describing identifying information on car while 
parked in his lot); p.132, Ls.1-6 (car washed, price gone); p.135, Ls.5-20 (items 
found in garbage).) 
The state charged Banbury with grand theft. (R., pp.8-9, 23-24.) A jury 
subsequently found Banbury guilty of the charged offense (R., pp.108-109) and 
the district court imposed a unified eight-year sentence with one year fixed (R., 
pp.147-148). Banbury filed a timely notice of appeal from the judgment of 
conviction. (R., pp.149-150.) 
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ISSUE 
Banbury states the issue on appeal as: 
Did the prosecutor commit misconduct, ns1ng to the level of a 
fundamental error, when a police officer testified at trial regarding 
Mr. Banbury's invocation of his right to remain silent for the purpose 
of inferring guilt? 
(Appellant's Brief, p.6.) 
The state rephrases the issue on appeal as: 
Has Banbury failed to establish he is entitled to relief based upon his 
unpreserved claim of prosecutorial misconduct? 
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ARGUMENT 
Banbury Has Failed To Show Fundamental Error With Respect To His 
Unpreserved Claim Of Prosecutorial Misconduct 
A. Introduction 
Banbury argues he is entitled to a new trial because, he asserts, the 
"prosecutor committed misconduct, rising to the level of a fundamental error, 
when a police officer made several statements at . . . trial regarding his 
invocation of his right to remain silent while being questioned by police." 
(Appellant's Brief, p.7.) Application of the legal standards governing such claims 
demonstrates Banbury has failed to show he is entitled to any relief. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"Generally Idaho's appellate courts will not consider error not preserved 
for appeal through an objection at trial." State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, _, 245 
P.3d 961, 976 (2010) (citations omitted). Where a claim is raised for the first time 
on appeal, the appellate court will consider whether the error alleged qualifies as 
fundamental error. Id. at 980. 
C. Banbury Has Failed To Establish Fundamental Error In Relation To The 
Introduction Of Testimony To Which He Did Not Object 
At trial, the prosecutor asked Lieutenant Scott Gay, who assisted in the 
investigation of Banbury's theft of Mr. Palmer's Cadillac, whether he advised 
Banbury of his "Miranda rights," to which Lieutenant Gay responded that he did. 
(Trial Tr., p.145, Ls.17-18.) A few questions later, the following exchange 
occurred, without objection: 
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Q: While you were [at Banbury's recover the 
keys to the car? 
A: I did. I asked him for the keys, them me. 
Q: When, when he gave you the keys, were they on a key ring? 
A: They were on a key ring with an additional key that didn't 
appear to be a GM key. 
Q: Did you ask him about the additional key? 
A: I did. It looked like a house key, and so I just - you know, 
obviously didn't belong to a Cadillac; and I asked him, "You know 
what the additional key was for?" I assumed it was the, the door to 
the house. 
He indicated actually it was a door to his bedroom there 
within the house, was a -- like a doorknob lock key, but only to lock 
his own bedroom 
Q: And after you recovered the key, what happened at that 
time? 
A: Got the keys. I asked him some questions about whether or 
not he had taken the car. He said he wanted to remain silent 
And I asked him also if his fingerprints would be located 
inside the car. He said, "Probably." 
I asked him if he'd washed the car. He said he wanted to 
remain silent on several of the questions. 
(Trial Tr., p.146, L.9 - p.147, L.9.) 
Although Banbury did not object to any of the prosecutor's questions, or 
Lieutenant Gay's answers, he claims on appeal that the testimony entitles him to 
a new trial because, he argues, "the testimony was non-responsive to the 
question asked, was irrelevant to the proper issues at trial, and was only 
provided for the purpose of having the jury infer [his] guilt." (Appellant's Brief, 
p.7.) All of Banbury's arguments lack merit. 
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Because Banbury did not object to the prosecutor's questions or 
Lieutenant Gay's answers, in order to prevail on his claim, Banbury must satisfy 
the three-part test articulated by the Idaho Supreme Court in Perry: 
(1) the defendant must demonstrate that one or more of the 
defendant's unwaived constitutional rights were violated, (2) the 
error must be clear or obvious, without the need for any additional 
information not contained in the appellate record, including 
information as to whether the failure to object was a tactical 
decision; and (3) the defendant must demonstrate that the error 
affected the defendant's substantial rights meaning (in most 
instances) that it must have affected the outcome of the trial 
proceedings. 
150 Idaho at_, 245 P.3d 978. Application of the three-part Perry standard to 
Banbury's claim of unpreserved error demonstrates he has failed to meet his 
burden of establishing he is entitled to reversal of his conviction. Banbury cannot 
satisfy any part of the Perry test. 
With respect to the first prong, Banbury does not explain how his claim 
that Lieutenant Gay's "testimony was non-responsive to the question asked [and] 
was irrelevant to the proper issues at trial" establishes a constitutional violation. 
(Appellant's Brief, pp.7-10.) Perhaps that is because non-responsive or 
irrelevant answers are, at best, evidentiary errors, not constitutional ones 
properly considered under a fundamental error analysis. State v. Norton, 151 
Idaho 176, ---, 254 P.3d 77, 83-84 (Ct. App. 2011) ("This Court will not entertain 
attempts to characterize alleged evidentiary errors, to which no objection was 
made at trial, as a due process violation of the right to a fair trial in a fair 
tribunal."). Banbury's only constitutional argument, which he implicitly asserts 
satisfies the first prong of Perry, is that the prosecutor's comments violated his 
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Fifth Amendment right not to testify. (Appellant's Brief, p.11.) While a criminal 
defendant undoubtedly has a Fifth Amendment right to remain silent, "the 
constitutional right against self-incrimination is not absolute and applies only 
when the silence is used solely for the purpose of implying guilt." State v. 
Ellington, 151 Idaho 53, ---, 253 P.3d 727,733 (2011) (quotations and citation 
omitted). Banbury argues that Lieutenant Gay's testimony about Banbury's 
invocation of his right to remain silent was "provided for the purpose of having the 
jury infer [his] guilt." (Appellant's Brief, p.9.) However, nowhere does Banbury 
explain the basis for this assertion. At no time did the prosecutor mention 
Banbury's invocation of his right to silence or his failure to respond to some of 
Lieutenant Gay's questions. (See generally Trial Tr., pp.107-110 (prosecutor's 
opening statement); pp.176-182 (prosecutor's closing statement); pp.187-189 
(prosecutor's rebuttal).) This was true even after defense counsel argued in his 
closing that there could have been numerous explanations for Banbury's 
behavior, which could only be provided by Banbury, but never were. (See,~. 
Trial Tr., p.184, Ls.17-22 (in explaining possible reasons why Banbury may have 
washed the car, counsel noted maybe Banbury "went out for a joyride and got it 
dirty and decided to wash it because he didn't want it to be dinged for some 
service fee or something when he brought it back" or maybe "he wanted to see 
what it looked like without the price tag in the window") p.185, Ls.2-6 (in 
explaining possible reasons why papers related to the car were in Banbury's 
house, counsel noted "[m]aybe he was cleaning the car out" or "[m]aybe he 
wanted to see what it looked like without that stuff in it").) It is also not apparent 
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from Lieutenant Gay's testimony alone that he made the statement for the 
purpose of implying guilt. To the contrary, the primary focus of Lieutenant Gay's 
testimony was to communicate what Banbury did say, not that he declined to 
answer other questions. Because Banbury's invocation of his right to remain 
silent was not used to imply guilt, Banbury has failed to establish a Fifth 
Amendment violation. 
With respect to the second prong of Perry, Banbury has failed to set forth 
any reason for concluding he can satisfy this step in the analysis. (See 
Appellant's Brief, pp.9-10.) There is no information in the record to inform 
whether the failure to object was a tactical decision by counsel. Just because 
counsel could have objected does not mean that it was not a tactical decision not 
to object. It is entirely possible that counsel concluded Lieutenant Gay's 
testimony was not particularly prejudicial and, rather than emphasize Banbury's 
failure to answer questions from law enforcement, he elected to instead offer the 
jury numerous possible explanations about Banbury's intent in order to create a 
reasonable doubt as to whether he meant to permanently deprive Mr. Palmer of 
the Cadillac. Emphasizing Banbury's silence to law enforcement would only 
pronounce the lack of evidence supporting the reasons proffered during closing 
argument about Banbury's intent in taking the vehicle. Banbury has not satisfied 
the second prong of~~ 
Even if Banbury could satisfy the first and second prongs of Perry, he 
cannot establish the third prong, i.e., that the error affected the outcome of the 
trial. Evidence of Banbury's guilt was overwhelming. Not only did Mr. Palmer 
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provide information identifying as 
was found at Banbury's house, but 
Cadillac and the key to the 
individual who took the car, which 
was caught "red-handed" with the 
Tr., p.118, Ls.3-10 (Mr. Palmer 
testified Banbury was wearing jeans, a t-shirt, a hat with "Twilight" on it, and had 
an ID hanging around his neck); p.134, 1 (at Banbury's house, police found 
a pair of jeans and a t-shirt "laid out on a bed as if someone had been wearing 
them" and a hat with "Twilight" embroidered on it"); p.144, Ls.22-24 (when asked 
by police for identification, Banbury provided his identification from a "lanyard-
type ID-holder").) The dealership placard from the Cadillac and the "as-is 
warranty slip" from the Cadillac were also found in Banbury's garbage. (Trial Tr., 
p.135, Ls.5-20.) Not only was there overwhelming evidence that Banbury stole 
the Cadillac, Banbury himself did not deny that he did so. As Banbury 
acknowledges on appeal, he instead argued that he was not guilty of grand theft 
because he did not have the intent to permanently deprrve Mr. Palmer of the 
Cadillac. (Trial Tr., pp.182-187.) Banbury, however, presented no actual 
evidence of any alternative intent and the evidence presented wholly 
contradicted such a claim. 
Contrary to Banbury's argument on appeal, Lieutenant Gay's testimony 
that Banbury indicated he wanted to remain silent on some of the questions he 
was asked about the theft was not "an indirect attack on [his} defense" 
(Appellant's Brief, p.10), particularly where, as here, the prosecutor never 
mentioned Banbury's "failure to cooperate" nor did he otherwise respond to the 
numerous speculative intentions offered during the defense's during closing 
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argument. Rather, the prosecutor properly focused on the affirmative evidence 
indicating Banbury had the requisite intent for grand theft, noting that the price 
had been washed off the Cadillac, "the sales placards had been removed" and 
"thrown away," and the warranty sheet had also been removed (Trial Tr., p.179, 
L.19 - p.180, 10.) The prosecutor adhered to this recitation of evidence in his 
rebuttal without ever commenting on Banbury's failure to offer to law 
enforcement, or at trial, the explanations he asserted in closing argument. (Trial 
Tr., pp.187-189.) Banbury's claim that "there is a reasonable possibility that 
[Lieutenant Gay's] testimony contributed to the jury's verdict in this case" is 
without merit. (Appellant's Brief, p.10.) 
Because Banbury has failed to establish constitutional error, much less 
fundamental error, his is not entitled to relief. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm Banbury's judgment 
of conviction for grand theft. 
DATED this 2ih day of April, 2012. 
JESS~f M
0
• LORELLO 
Deput'y)Attorney General 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 2th day of April, 2012, served a true 
and correct copy of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by causing a copy 
addressed to: 
SARAH E. TOMPKINS 
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
to be placed in The State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the Idaho 
Supreme Court Clerk's office. 
JML/pm 
JESSICt M. LORELLO 
Deputy 8-ttorney General 
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